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Exchange Economies and Loss Exposure: Experiments 
Exploring Prospect Theory and Competitive Equilibria 
in Market Environments 
By MIKHAIL MYAGKOV AND CHARLES R. PLOrr* 
Exchange economies were created in which individuals faced losses. If people 
are risk seeking in the losses, as predicted by prospect theory, then due to the 
nonconvexity, the competitive equilibria are all on the boundaries of the 
Edgeworth Box. The experimental results are that risk-seeking behavior is ob- 
served in many people and appears in markets as predicted. In addition, market 
behavior is consistent with answers to hypothetical questionnaires. Contrary to 
prospect theory, risk seeking seems to diminish with experience; preferences in 
the market setting are not labile; and risk-seeking preferences are not simply a 
result offraming effects. (JEL C91, C92, D50, D80) 
Recent years have found attempts to inte- 
grate ideas from a psychology research tradi- 
tion with ideas from economics. The integration 
is difficult because the purposes of the two sci- 
entific enterprises differ and the methodologies 
differ. Nevertheless, the lessons from one ap- 
proach can sometimes find applications in the 
other. This paper is an attempt to accomplish 
such an intellectual arbitrage by merging ex- 
perimental methods from economics with the- 
ory suggested by psychology. 
The central focus of the experiments re- 
ported below is a psychological theory, called 
prospect theory (Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky, 1979), which has received substan- 
tial attention in the decision literature (Colin 
Camerer, 1995). The substance of prospect 
theory is the process of individual decision- 
making as opposed to market activity and 
price formation typical of economics. For the 
most part, economists have not been interested 
in the process of individual decisions. Instead, 
economics has proceeded on the assumption 
that the consequences of the individual 
decision-making process, whatever they might 
be, will become manifest in the form of an 
individual preference relation. Thus, individ- 
ual choices will be reflections of the attitudes 
that are summarized by the concept of a 
preference. 
The individual in economics is captured by 
a preference relation over states of the world. 
By contrast, the individual in psychology is a 
complex of processes that might be subject to 
any number of influences that are sometimes 
summarized by a concept of framing. Consis- 
tency such as transitivity does not follow from 
psychological theory. Individuals can order 
things if asked to do so, but the ordering is la- 
bile and may bear no relationship to choices. In 
fact, it is not even clear if the concept of a pref- 
erence is relevant from the point of view of 
prospect theory. Tversky et al. (1988 p. 383) 
put the issue well-"If different elicitation 
procedures produce different orderings of op- 
tions, how can preferences and values be de- 
fined? And in what sense do they exist?" In 
summary, the substance of research from psy- 
chology is that preferences are labile (Tversky 
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and Kahneman, 1986, 1981), because the pro- 
cess used by individuals to make decisions is 
subject to subtle framing effects. Thus, while 
the processes used by individuals may be sta- 
ble, the existence of a summarizing character- 
istic of an individual such as a relatively stable 
or unchanging (nonlabile) preference is denied. 
The apparent differences between the psy- 
chological view of the individual and the eco- 
nomic view of the individual seem to emerge 
from three sources. First, prospect theory is 
about a process of decision-making and not 
necessarily about a preference that exists as 
some stable or constant property of an indi- 
vidual. The principles of the psychological 
model address the nature of the steps that oc- 
cur when a process of decision is evoked. Sec- 
ond, the theory addresses one-time decisions 
as opposed to repeated decisions or perhaps 
even "'substantially considered" decisions 
that might take place in markets. Third, the 
sources of data are questionnaires and inter- 
views as opposed to the market choices that 
are typical of data in economics. Furthermore, 
the purpose of the questionnaires is not to mea- 
sure some property of an individual (such as 
the slope of an indifference curve) as would 
be the case in economics; the purpose is to 
demonstrate properties of a decision-making 
process that might produce substantially dif- 
ferent decisions under slightly altered condi- 
tions. Thus, a tension between the two 
disciplines can easily result from a lack of re- 
alization that they are focused on different as- 
pects of behavior and different sources of data. 
The purpose of the research reported here is 
to ask if prospect theory and the methods used 
to support it can be employed to produce a 
model that captures data in a purely economic 
context. The research cannot be viewed as a 
test of prospect theory as developed by psy- 
chologists because it is being applied to a con- 
text and in a manner that differs substantially 
from what the originators of the theory in- 
tended. The differences are so dramatic that it 
might be more appropriate to refer to the the- 
ory that is to be applied here as "extended 
prospect theory," rather than prospect theory, 
in order to emphasize that the liberties taken 
with the theory reside entirely with the present 
authors and not with the psychologists that are 
proponents of the theory.' The "extended 
prospect theory" is a theory of preferences, as 
opposed to prospect theory, which is a theory 
of decision-making process. 
Exchange economies were created in which 
only losses can occur. If the principles of pros- 
pect theory are assumed to dictate properties 
of a stable individual preference, as opposed 
to a property of the process used to make de- 
cisions, then the (extended and modified) the- 
ory has definite consequences for what should 
be observed. More precisely, prospect theory 
implies concavity of indifference curves in the 
loss domain as opposed to the usual convexity 
assumption of economics. With the usual con- 
vexity assumptions violated, the competitive 
equilibria in an exchange economy have dis- 
tinct properties if the equilibria exist. The re- 
search reported here investigates whether or 
not those properties are observed. 
The first section of the paper outlines rele- 
vant aspects of extended prospect theory and 
the questions to be posed by the research. The 
second section details the experimental envi- 
ronments. The third section specifies the mod- 
els that are needed to produce predictions about 
market behavior. The fourth section contains 
the results. The fifth section contains the results 
of some special experiments that were con- 
ducted to check the theoretical coherence (or 
robustness) of the results reported in the body 
of the text. These experiments help eliminate 
some obvious alternative hypotheses that might 
be used to explain the pattern of observed re- 
sults. The final section summarizes and con- 
cludes the paper. The Appendices contain 
'Several involved e-mail conversations serve to em- 
phasize that the psychologists claim that the theory, as 
they use it, makes no clear predications under the condi- 
tions of the experiments reported in this paper. Examples 
of a lack of consensus is revealed by the following objec- 
tions to the application of prospect theory to the markets 
studied here. ( 1 ) The incentives are such that subjects par- 
ticipate to earn money so all lotteries could be viewed as 
gains and no asymmetries in behavior would be observed. 
(2) Prospect theory is a theory of choice and not a theory 
of exchange. Exchange involves a procedural invariance 
that is not part of prospect theory. (3) The exchange en- 
vironment is complex and with each trade a different ref- 
erence point can be established. Prospect theory has yet to 
deal with the problem of multiple reference points. 
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experimental instructions and the statements 
and proofs of theorems used in the theory. 
I. Research Questions 
A fundamental difference exists between 
prospect theory and the traditional expected 
utility hypothesis, as found in economics. The 
expected utility hypothesis rests on the prop- 
osition that choices are made as if there exists 
a preference relation over lotteries over final 
states. It is as if the final outcome is the source 
of value and, in turn, the choices reflect a pro- 
cess of optimization modulated by attitudes to- 
ward risk. By contrast, prospect theory does 
not proceed on the presumption that a prefer- 
ence exists for final states. Individual decisions 
reflect optimization based on values but these 
values rest upon changes of states from some 
reference point, which for purposes of discus- 
sion could be viewed as a status quo. Further- 
more, the value function is postulated to have 
a very distinct shape. 
Briefly put, prospect theory rests on four 
axioms. 
(i) Decision utilities. Decisions reflect a 
maximization based upon decision 
utilities. 
(ii) Reference dependence. The carriers of 
decision utilities are changes in states 
(prospects) as opposed to outcomes or 
final states. These changes are relative 
to some outcome called the reference 
point. 
(iii) Loss aversion. The decision utility func- 
tion is steeper in the losses than in the 
gains. That is, the negative of a given 
movement in the loss direction from the 
reference point outweighs a positive of 
an equal movement in the gain direction. 
(iv) Diminishing sensitivity. The decision 
utility function is convex in the loss do- 
main and concave in the gain domain. 
Prospect theory is an alternative to the 
expected utility hypothesis as a descriptive 
theory of decisions, but it has not been system- 
atically applied to market environments. By 
implication, since the expected utility hypoth- 
esis is routinely used in economics, prospect 
theory might serve as an alternative foundation 
for market models. Exactly how one might ap- 
ply the theory is not clear since the concept of 
a reference point in a rapidly moving market 
situation is itself not clear, and to date there is 
no substantial evidence that prospect theory, 
as articulated by psychologists, is applicable 
to markets. However, the literature contains 
reports (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; 
Kahneman et al., 1990; Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1991 ) that traces of phenomena pre- 
dicted by the theory have been detected. 
The approach taken in this research is to cre- 
ate a market in which only "losses" can be 
realized and to study the resulting market be- 
havior. Subjects were paid a flat amount of 
money ($60) in cash before the experiment 
began, which they kept during the course of 
the experiment. Once in the experiment they 
could only lose. Literally, subjects paid money 
to the experimenter. The amount of loss de- 
pended upon the decisions they made to buy 
and to sell lotteries, which were the functional 
equivalent of insurance. 
Each individual was given an initial endow- 
ment of units of lottery (insurance) which 
could be sold for cash. Or, if the individual 
wished (s)he could use cash to buy units of 
lottery (insurance) from other individuals. The 
setting was that of an exchange economy to 
which a standard competitive model might be 
applied. If individuals were risk averse then the 
indifference curves would take the usual con- 
vex properties and the competitive equilibria 
would necessarily be of one class. If individuals 
were risk seeking then the indifference curves 
would take a concave property and the com- 
petitive equilibria would have a boundary prop- 
erty of a different class. Intuitively speaking, if 
the indifference curves of the Edgeworth Box 
are convex then the competitive equilibria tend 
to have an interior property, and if the indiffer- 
ence curves are concave then the competitive 
equilibria tend to take a boundary property. The 
following sections of the paper make these 
properties precise. 
A day or two prior to the experiment, 
subjects were given a classroom questionnaire 
to complete. This questionnaire contained 
choices between lotteries similar to those that 
were used in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
to demonstrate a risk-seeking propensity in the 
loss domain. Thus, a measurement similar to 
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the ones used by psychologists was taken. The 
purpose was to compare behavior as revealed 
in the questionnaire with behavior revealed in 
the markets. 
The following four general questions are 
posed for research. 
( l ) Is there any consistent equilibration be- 
havior observed within and across experimen- 
tal markets? Unlike many previous market 
studies, the preferences explored in the exper- 
iments reported here have not been induced. If 
the reference point changes depending upon 
the context of the decision, then preferences 
might exhibit labile properties and, as a result, 
the markets might be erratic. 
(2) Can market adjustments be associated 
with the equilibrium predications of the com- 
petitive model? As will be discussed later, the 
competitive model contains reasonably precise 
predictions about market behavior. However, 
there are very few studies in which the under- 
lying parameters might not be convex. How 
the markets might behave under such circum- 
stances is a question of general interest. 
(3) If patterns of equilibration are observed 
do they imply the existence of risk-averse peo- 
ple, do they imply the existence of risk-seeking 
people, or do they imply the existence of both? 
The standard model typically assumes that peo- 
ple will be risk averse while a reasonable appli- 
cation of prospect theory would produce people 
that are risk seeking. Is risk seeking in the losses 
a property of individual preferences? Such a dis- 
covery would be of special interest because sub- 
jects in market experiments are generally 
observed exhibiting risk-avoiding behavior 
(sealed bid experiments and speculation exper- 
iments are typical). 
(4) Is there any relationship between an- 
swers to the questionnaires and the behavior 
exhibited in the markets? Do the question- 
naires produce measurements that predict be- 
havior in the context of operating markets? Do 
questionnaires capture a property of an indi- 
vidual as opposed to a process of decision? 
Psychologists typically do not view the ques- 
tionnaire as measuring a property of an indi- 
vidual and instead view it as a demonstration 
of the operation of certain aspects of a decision 
process. Economists are typically skeptical of 
any methodology in which questionnaires are 
used, so the question is of relevance along at 
least two dimensions. 
II. Experimental Environment, Design, 
and Procedures 
A total of ten experiments were conducted. 
The first nine of them (as summarized in Table 
1) were held under identical economic and in- 
centive environments. Experiments are in- 
dexed by the date of the experiment. The tenth 
one was a "control" experiment conducted on 
0516. Its purpose and design will be discussed 
in Section V of this paper. Until then we dis- 
cuss only the first nine experiments. Each ex- 
periment involved six to ten subjects. Subjects 
for some expenrments were recruited from the 
California Institute of Technology and the ex- 
periments were conducted at the Caltech Lab- 
oratory for Experimental Economics and 
Political Science. Other subjects were re- 
cruited from classes at the University of 
Southern California and the experiments were 
conducted at the USC Experimental Econom- 
ics Laboratory. 
Subjects participated in one or two identical 
experiments. In all but 0324 and 0509 exper- 
iments, the subjects were first-time partici- 
pants. We call them "inexperienced subjects" 
(see Table 1). All of the subjects who were 
used in 0324 and 0509 experiments were 
second-time participants ("experienced sub- 
jects" ) recruited from subject pools of one of 
the previous experiments with the first-time 
participants. None of the subjects had experi- 
ence in experiments prior to the experiments 
reported here. 
The economic and incentive environments 
were as follows. Subjects were given $60 be- 
fore the beginning of the experiment (they 
were handed the money in cash).2 They were 
2The instructions say: "For your agreement to partic- 
ipate you will be paid $60." This was handed to them in 
cash. Then subjects were informed that participation in- 
volved the possibility of losing a portion of their money. 
The experiment was designed in such a way that no one 
could lose more than the $60 that they had in their hand. 
No one could sell more than the inventory they had and 
no one could spend more than the cash on hand that they 
were allocated. The parameters chosen guarantee limita- 
tion on possible losses. 
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TABLE 1-TRANSACTION PRICES (WITH STANDARD DEVIATIONS) AND TOTAL NET VOLUMES 
Experiment 
Date 0228 0316 0317 0324 0428 0501 0502 0505 0509 
Location USC USC USC USC CIT CIT CIT CIT CIT 
Experience No No No Yes No No No No Yes 
Period # Average transaction prices (standard deviations) 
0 50.35 23.29 33.01 32.82 38.19 55.21 41.15 98.18 48.85 
(48.4) (15.9) (19.5) (18.3) (14.3) (10.1) (17.1) (59.4) (3.51) 
1 51.44 21.97 43.54 34.49 47.53 51.45 44.53 49.54 42.91 
(26.6) (5.61) (7.74) (6.77) (4.21) (6.31) (8.16) (4.81) (3.38) 
2 64.12 24.05 43.18 39.33 48.17 51.85 49.41 48.81 41.98 
(15.7) (7.48) (7.09) (29.2) (1.21) (4.28) (2.34) (6.90) (7.53) 
3 56.14 26.34 44.21 39.48 48.37 50.57 48.18 46.90 43.35 
(15.8) (10.9) (4.75) (9.44) (5.64) (1.01) (3.38) (3.43) (10.3) 
4 43.33 24.17 44.83 41.27 49.15 51.20 49.20 45.70 40.77 
(11.4) (10.3) (3.48) (9.46) (0.73) (0.77) (5.14) (1.59) (2.04) 
5 42.75 45.12 43.69 48.41 49.65 49.63 44.24 41.58 
(9.2) (3.81) (2.36) (5.23) (1.25) (1.10) (0.83) (2.28) 
6 39.61 48.36 44.88 49.04 50.67 49.84 46.92 41.51 
(9.5) (1.31) (3.92) (1.05) (0.93) (1.23) (1.27) (1.19) 
7 - 46.03 - 50.42 49.17 47.57 42.47 
(1.73) (0.64) (0.46) (0.94) (1.36) 
8 - 47.37 - - 47.18 
(0.72) -- (0.73) 
Competitive equilibrium predictions about total net volumes 
100 100 100 100 80 100 80 60 100 
Actual total net volumes 
0 34 66 81 54 60 54 38 28 42 
1 48 46 62 60 52 67 42 23 87 
2 67 52 67 58 37 101 55 48 95 
3 38 32 64 55 54 54 71 23 80 
4 54 34 62 55 55 62 70 50 90 
5 26 - 60 48 60 67 53 43 88 
6 42 - 56 51 55 76 60 40 93 
7 52 78 73 40 83 
8 - 50 - 40 
Note: Boldface denotes practice periods. 
told that the money was theirs but as a result 
of the experiment they could lose some of it. 
They were told that the amount of the loss 
would depend upon the decisions they would 
make during the market and on the outcome 
of a roll of dice. The word "loss" was used 
in the instructions in much the same way as it 
is used in these paragraphs. 
In the economic environment there were 
two goods that could be traded. Each individual 
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was given an initial endowment of variable M 
and X. M is the notation of the numeraire (in- 
structively, M stands for money). The initial 
endowment of M was mo = 1000 and m is the 
quantity of M held at the end of a period. X is 
the notation of the commodity (intuitively, X 
stands for lottery). The initial endowment of 
X was xo = 20 units and x equals the quantity 
of X held at the end of a period. Each subject 
was told that (s)he faced two possible losses: 
Loss A and Loss B. That is, Total Loss = Loss 
A + Loss B. The final loss exposure for a pe- 
riod of trading was 
Loss A = ($20 - (1 / 1 00) m) and 
Loss B (O0{Prob 1/2} or $40 
- x{Prob 1/2}). 
As can be seen, the variable M is literally 
money embedded in a loss framework and the 
variable X is a quantity of insurance. The ex- 
pected value of Loss B offset from a one-unit 
increase in X is $0.50. Since the value of one 
unit of M is $0.01, the trade-off that leaves 
total expected loss unchanged is 50 units of M 
for one unit of X. That is, the risk-neutral price 
of X should be $0.50. 
In order to keep the losses as losses, the 
amounts A and B were constrained to be non- 
negative. Therefore, subject's marginal utili- 
ties became zero beyond final holdings 40 
units of X and beyond 2000 units of M. 
Subjects were trained to participate in a 
multiple-unit double auction (MUDA) as im- 
plemented through a computerized market. 
Standard training procedures were followed. 
The variable M as defined appeared as cash on 
hand and X was inventory. 
Subjects in USC participated in three (and 
one in Caltech) practice market periods with- 
out payoff or exposure. These were used to test 
and train subjects about the accounting and 
how the markets functioned. The practice pe- 
riods were followed by real periods in which 
the outcomes or final holdings (m and x) rep- 
resented actual loss exposures. Each period the 
endowments were reset to the initial levels and 
no carryovers were allowed. At the end of sev- 
eral real periods one period was chosen at ran- 
dom (one of the subjects rolled dice), and the 
lotteries that resulted from the trading during 
that period were actually played (once again a 
subject rolled the dice.). The losses were col- 
lected from the subjects and they were allowed 
to go.3 
The instructions and accounting forms are 
included in Appendix A. Subjects first read 
the instructions and then were asked to answer 
the questions in an exercise that in essence 
tested their understanding of the content of the 
instructions. After the first two experiments a 
subject selection procedure was implemented. 
More subjects were recruited than were 
necessary-typically four or five extras. The 
first ten subjects who correctly answered all 
questions were allowed to participate. All 
other subjects were paid $5 and were dis- 
missed. This procedure was introduced to save 
time in the administration of the experiment 
and thereby have the opportunity to conduct 
more periods. 
A questionnaire was administered to the 
entire classes from which subjects were later 
recruited. No reference to the questionnaire 
was made during the experiment or was it 
associated with the experiment in any other 
way. The questions themselves include the rel- 
evant questions from Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979). They are of the form: 
"What would you choose: to lose $50 for sure 
or $100 with probability = 1/2?" 
"What would you choose: to win $200 for 
sure or $400 with probability = 1/2?" 
An individual that prefers a lottery to the 
expected values of the lottery is exhibiting 
risk-seeking type of answers. The stylized fact 
that has emerged from the Kahneman and 
Tversky research is that people are risk seek- 
ing in the losses. The data in support of this 
' Under conditions of the expected utility hypothesis, 
this compound lottery has no influence on behavior. The 
implications of such a compound lottery for various forms 
of prospect theory or even extended prospect theory are 
only a matter of speculation at this time. The hypothesis 
maintained throughout the analysis in this paper is that the 
compound lottery does not influence the revealed prefer- 
ence for the lotteries at each period. 
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stylized fact are almost exclusively answers to 
questionnaires. 
III. Model 
The model that will be used to guide the 
analysis will be the general competitive equi- 
librium for an exchange economy. However, 
the use of the model will be a step beyond the 
usual applications in experimental markets. 
With the traditional use, preferences are in- 
duced and therefore known, and the reliability 
of the theory is tested. In the application at 
hand the preferences are not known, the reli- 
ability of the theory is assumed, and the ob- 
served market behavior is used to determine 
the nature of the preferences that must have 
existed in the experiment. 
It is well known that that the general com- 
petitive equilibrium model is reasonably ac- 
curate under conditions in which preferences 
are induced and, thus, can be assumed to be 
known and fixed (Charles N. Noussair et al., 
1995; Peng Lian and Plott, 1998). Further- 
more, it is known that the predictions of the 
model are also accurate under preference con- 
ditions that produce market instability (Plott 
and Glen George, 1992). Thus, the analysis at 
hand will rest on a general assumption that, 
regardless of the preferences that may be pres- 
ent in the economies, the market will seek the 
competitive equilibrium as long as one exists. 
Of course, under the conditions of the exper- 
iments reported here, the preferences are not 
known and, according to the psychology lit- 
erature, might not be fixed, or might not even 
exist. However, the key feature of extended 
prospect theory considered in this research is 
that preferences will exist and are of a form 
that can cause market instability in the sense 
that individuals will want to move towards a 
"boundary" of an opportunity set. The anal- 
ysis will address the nature of equilibrium in 
cases in which different numbers of individu- 
als might be risk averse (RA), risk seeking 
(RS) and risk neutral (RN). 
The first proposition to be established is the 
relationships among assumptions about risk- 
seeking propensities, risk aversion, and the 
shapes of indifference curves. From the point 
of view of the model, the individual must 
choose a combination of two commodities, M 
and X. Preferences over these two commodi- 
ties reflect the fact that different combinations 
determine different lotteries over monetary 
losses. The individual is assumed to be an ex- 
pected utility maximizer over lotteries, but the 
indifference curves for m and x (the final hold- 
ings of M and X, respectively) will differ ac- 
cording to the individual's attitude toward 
risk. 
The outcome for an individual is Loss A 
plus Loss B. Loss A is a loss for sure and Loss 
B occurs with a 0.5 probability. Thus, the To- 
tal Loss can be recombined into a choice of 
lotteries dictated by a choice of x and m, and 
are of the form: 0.5 probability of either loss = 
{$(20 - m/100} or loss = {$(60 - m/100 - 
x) }. Thus, the expected value of the loss is 
E(loss) = 40 - m/100 - 0.5x. Notice that 
E(loss)' = 0.5, where Fy denotes the deriv- 
ative of the function F( ) with respect to the 
variable y. In other words, in the range of 0 - 
m - 2000, 0 ? x ? 40, the expected loss re- 
duction of a unit increase in x is $0.50. That 
is, the actuarially fair market price of a unit of 
X is 50 units of M. 
Three general background assumptions will 
be used throughout: 
(a) The commodity space is two dimen- 
sional as characterized by the variables M and 
X, which characterize exposure to lotteries of 
monetary losses or changes in wealth from 
some current value of w. The important part 
of the commodity space is where M and X take 
the respective values 0 _ m _ 2000, 0 _ 
x _ 40, but individual choices are not re- 
stricted to these intervals, other than quantities 
meet the nonnegativity conditions. 
(b) An individual's preferences over lot- 
teries are as if the individual wished to 
maximize the expected value of a (twice dif- 
ferentiable) utility function of money. 
(c) The relevant reference point for pur- 
poses of application of prospect theory is w, 
the wealth of the individual before making lot- 
tery choices. 
Assumptions (a) and (b) can be summa- 
rized by an assumption that the individuals 
choose m and x to maximize EU(w, m, x) = 
0.5U(w, w + m/100 - 20) + 0.5U(w, w + 
m/ 100 + x - 60). The analysis will suppress 
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w since it assumed to be the same throughout 
the experiment.4 
Figure 1 can be used to illustrate the fun- 
damental implications of expended prospect 
theory within the environment of the experi- 
mental markets. That is, the outcomes involve 
losses as defined above and the initial endow- 
ments are (mo, xo) = ( 1000, 20). All proper- 
ties used are proved in Proposition B 1, which 
appears in Appendix B. 
If individuals are risk averse the indiffer- 
ence curves would be as shown in the upper 
panel of the figure. At a price of 50 or below, 
a risk-averse individual (RA) would spend all 
M on X. Intuitively, if the price of insurance 
is lower than (or equal to) 50, then the ex- 
pected value of the loss is lower than (or equal 
to) a fair bet and a risk-averse individual 
would prefer to spend the money to avoid the 
exposure to risk, until fully insured. In other 
words, all RA individuals would be willing to 
buy as much insurance as is possible up to 20 
units (point D). After 20 units, the individual 
is perfectly insured and additional units have 
no value, as shown by the horizontal indiffer- 
ence curves. As the price goes higher than 50, 
the RA individual's demand would fall contin- 
uously (point E). At some point, if the price 
gets sufficiently high, the RA individual might 
even start selling X (the insurance). The ver- 
tical parts of the indifference curves indicate 
that above 2000 additional M has no value 
since the loss for certain is completely offset. 
Thus, the excess demand functions of RA in- 
dividuals are exactly 20 at prices at or below 
50, but at prices above 50 the excess demands 
continuously drop and eventually would be- 
come excess supplies. 
The lower part of Figure 1 contains indif- 
ference curves for a risk-seeking individual 
(RS). The fact of concavity of indifference 
curves as a consequence of convexity of the 
utility function is demonstrated by Proposition 
B 1 (see Appendix B). The initial endowments 
are (mo, xo) = (1000, 20) and the maximum 
amount of X the individual would want to hold 
is 40 and the maximum M is 2000. Beyond 
these limits the individual is fully insured, as 
shown by the horizontal (vertical) indiffer- 
ence curves. At any price of X of 50 or above, 
the RS individual will always be on the seller 
side of the market. The individual would sell 
X, insurance, and move to the points at a level 
of 2000 M. At a price slightly below 50, the 
RS would continue doing this. However, there 
is a sufficiently low price at which a RS indi- 
vidual is indifferent between buying and sell- 
ing 20 units. In other words, the individual is 
indifferent between points B and B '. At a price 
below this critical value the RS individual will 
only demand 20 units of X. The insurance is 
so cheap that the RS would prefer to buy rather 
than sell. Thus the resulting demand function 
of a RS individual must be discontinuous. An 
important thing to notice is that under any 
price below (or equal to) 50, a RS always 
wants to have final holdings at the boundaries 
(of the positive marginal utility ranges). Thus, 
the excess demand function would jump by 40 
units as the individual switches from a position 
of selling 20 units to a position of buying 20 
units. 
Risk-neutral individuals (RN) will buy 20 
units at any price below 50 and sell units at 
any price above 50. At a price of 50 they are 
indifferent between buying and selling (up to 
the 20 units). Thus, the RN have excess de- 
mand similar to the RA at prices below 50 and 
similar to RS at prices above 50. 
With the properties of individual excess de- 
mand functions established, the analysis can 
focus on the properties of equilibrium that can 
emerge from an exchange economy. Proposi- 
tion B2 (see Appendix B) establishes the im- 
portant results that in an exchange economy 
with the conditions of the experimental envi- 
ronment and with an even number of individ- 
uals: (i) a competitive equilibrium necessarily 
exists; (ii) if the price is above 50 then the 
number of risk-averse (RA) plus the number 
of risk-neutral (RN) is at least as large as the 
number of risk-seeking (RS) individuals; and 
(iii) if the price is less than 50 then the number 
of RS is no smaller than the number of RA 
plus the number of RN. 
The intuition for properties (ii) and (iii) is 
easy to establish. Suppose the price has equil- 
4 Ordinarily, applications of the expected utility hy- 
pothesis would assume that the function was of the form 
U(w + Aw). 
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ibrated at above 50. All RS and all RN are 
necessarily sellers of X.5 The RA are buyers 
of x 5 20 units each. Since at equilibrium the 
quantity supplied equals the quantity de- 
manded and since there is an even number of 
agents, the number of RS can be no greater 
than the number of RA and RN combined. 
Suppose the price is below 50. All RA and all 
RN are buyers of 20 units each. Some of the 
RS may be buyers of 20 each and all others 
will be sellers of 20. Since at equilibrium the 
quantity supplied equals the quantity de- 
manded and since there is an even number of 
agents, the number of RS must be at least as 
large as the number of RA and RN combined. 
Figure 1 will help develop an intuition for 
existence. Only the case of an equilibrium be- 
low 50 will be considered. (For the general 
case see Proposition B2 in Appendix B). As- 
sume that the number of RS exceeds the num- 
ber of RA. For convenience, assume there are 
no RN. As shown in the figure, an excess sup- 
ply exists. The magnitude of this excess supply 
is 20 times the excess number of RS. As the 
price falls, some RS will shift discontinuously 
from a position of net seller of 20 units to a 
position of net buyer of 20 units. The excess 
supply will fall by 40 units each time an RS 
individual switches. The excess demand must 
become exactly zero at some point.6 Thus, 
equilibrium existence is established. Such an 
equilibrium is illustrated in the figure. 
The nature of the equilibrium has immediate 
consequences for the volume. The important 
ones are summarized by the next observation: 
OBSERVATION: If the price is lower than 
50 then all individuals should trade 20 units. 
Furthermore, the number of buyers should 
equal the number of sellers and the volume 
should be 20 times one-half the number of in- 
dividuals in the market. 
Thus, in an environment in which there is 
an even number of people, each of whom fol- 
lows the expected utility hypotheses and is ei- 
ther risk avoiding, risk neutral, or risk seeking, 
the major results can be summarized as fol- 
lows. If, and only if, there are as many risk- 
seeking individuals as there are risk-averse 
and risk-neutral individuals, then the compet- 
itive equilibrium price will be less than the 
"fair bet value" of 50M per unit of X. Fur- 
thermore, at the equilibrium all agents will be 
either buying or selling 20 units of X. The 
number of buyers will equal the number of 
sellers and total volume will be 20 times the 
number of individuals divided by two. If 
someone does not participate, or if an indi- 
vidual has preferences that are substantially 
different from those postulated, then the dy- 
namics of the markets still could be similar 
because of the limited influence one individual 
might have by virtue of the constraints on the 
budget set. Of course, existence of equilibrium 
in the model is another thing and the presence 
of such individuals could force the system into 
an environment in which the competitive equi- 
librium does not exist. 
IV. Results 
The time series of all periods of three of nine 
loss-condition experiments are shown in Fig- 
ures 2A, 2B, and 2C. Shown there are the con- 
tract prices as they occurred in time. The 
vertical bars represent the change of periods. 
A large black vertical bar represents the 
change from the practice periods to the periods 
for which the consequences would result in ac- 
tual losses. While the figures show all data in- 
cluding the practice periods, only the real 
payoff periods are considered in the data anal- 
'The reader should be warned that the parameter we 
used in this portion of the argument is delicate because of 
satiation. Since the price is above fifty, and since the in- 
dividuals become satiated in M at 2000, sellers will sell 
less than 20 units. 
6 The intuition of the proof can be seen in the following 
argument. Let B be the number of buyers and S be the 
number of sellers and let the number of individuals (B + 
S) equal 2k for some k > 0 (recall that the number of 
individuals is even). Excess supply = 20B - 20S = 
20B - 20(2k - B) = 40(B - k). Note that the excess 
supply is necessarily divisible by 40. Now, recall that a 
switch of a RS from a seller to a buyer as prices fall results 
in a drop in total excess supply of 40. (Assume, for con- 
venience, that all preferences differ so only one person 
switches at a time.) Since 40 necessarily divides excess 
supply by (B - k), the zero of the excess supply function 
(equilibrium) will necessarily be reached in B - k steps. 
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ysis discussed in this section. The practice ses- 
sion is included only for illustrative purposes. 
The horizontal line is the actuarially fair price 
of 50. 
The impression from the figures is that 
transaction prices tend to be lower than 50 and 
that in most cases prices settled to some sort 
of an "asymptote." The impression is sup- 
ported by the first result. The importance of 
the result is that according to the model, the 
implication of such prices is that at least one- 
half of the subjects in the experiments were 
risk seeking. 
RESULT 1: The transaction prices tend to be 
no higher than the risk-neutral level of 50. 
The estimated asymptotes of such movements 
were lower than 50. 
SUPPORT: 
The first claim of the result relies on the data 
presented in Table 1. The numbers in the upper 
part of the table are average transaction prices 
across actual payoff periods and experiments. 
Notice that there are only seven exceptions to 
the statement of the result, and six of these 
exceptions exist only in experiment 0501. In 
many periods of several experiments the av- 
erage prices were within one cent of the risk- 
neutral price of 50, thereby suggesting the 
hypothesis that subjects were risk neutral and 
that subjective transaction costs would account 
for the difference. This possibility is discussed 
later in the paper. For now, it must be remem- 
bered that virtually all transactions were made 
below the risk-neutral level of 50 (see Figures 
2A, 2B, and 2C). (Figure 2D for 0516 is a 
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control experiment that will be used for com- 
parisons and is discussed in detail later.) 
For the second claim of the result, the des- 
tination and the direction of the equilibration 
process must be determined. The destination 
and the direction of the price convergence was 
evaluated by the application of a simple dy- 
namic model (Noussair et al., 1995). The 
model assumes that price (dependent variable) 
may start from a different origin for each ex- 
periment, but the convergence is assumed to 
be to a common asymptote in all experiments. 
Formally the model is as follows: 
Pit = B11D1(1/t) + * * * + BIKDK(1/t) 
+ B2((t - 1)/t) + uit, 
where i is the index of the experiment; Dj are 
dummy variables that take value 1 if i = j and 
value 0 otherwise; t is time measured in terms 
of experimental period number; K is number 
of experiments; Pit is the average price in pe- 
riod t of the experiment i; and u is a random 
variable, distributed normally with 0 mean. BIi 
measures origin of the price convergence pro- 
cess, and B2 is an asymptote. 
Data in Table 2A show ordinary least- 
squares estimation of the model. The estimated 
asymptote was 46.11 and the risk-neutral equi- 
librium price was at 50. Thus, the statistical 
model suggests that the price equilibration was 
to the price lower than the risk-neutral evel of 
50. 
The next result is focused on the conver- 
gence process and the degree to which it can 
be described as being toward the competitive 
equilibrium. It is important to note that the re- 
sult addresses a convergence process because 
none of the processes could be said to have 
perfectly equilibrated. 
RESULT 2: Market movement toward a 
competitive equilibrium was observed across 
experiments. The propensity for movement to- 
ward competitive equilibrium quantities is 
more pronounced as subjects have experience 
in more than one experiment, while the evi- 
dence is mixed for inexperienced subjects. 
SUPPORT: 
The first step of the support is to show that 
a tendency towards price equilibration was ob- 
served across experiments in a sense of a fall- 
ing variance of price. Data in Table 1 show 
that the standard deviations of the prices were 
lower in the final periods of every experiment, 
compared to earlier periods, thus suggesting 
price equilibration. 
The next step is to determine if one of several 
patterns of competitive equilibria predicted by 
the model was observed across experiments. The 
competitive model predicts a pattern of prices 
and closely related final holdings. We know 
from Result 1 that prices as well as the asymp- 
totes of the process were no higher than 50 in 
all but one experiment. Thus, the equilibrium 
final holdings should be at the boundaries of the 
positive marginal utilities and the number of sell- 
ers should equal the number of buyers (Obser- 
vation). In equilibrium each subject should have 
bought or sold 20 units of inventory, thus mak- 
ing final holdings equal to 40 or 0. 
Data on final holdings are less decisive than 
on prices, but relevant statistics are in Table 
2B. Shown there are the numbers of individ- 
uals who increased or decreased their holding 
of X by various levels. The last two periods of 
an experiment were averaged for each individ- 
ual and used as the measure to indicate the 
individual's position. The numbers of buyers 
are approximately equal to the numbers of 
sellers (40 vs. 38), and 57 out of 78 people 
have moved halfway (at least nine units) or 
more toward the boundaries. This is more than 
73 percent of the individuals. 
The fact that not all of the individuals have 
moved to the extremes shows up again in the 
volume numbers. Data in the lower part of Ta- 
ble 1 show the time series of net trade volumes 
across experiments. In five out of nine exper- 
iments the volumes were substantially lower 
than the predictions of the competitive model 
and there were no clear signs of volume con- 
vergence to the predicted quantities.7 
7 The relevance of this phenomena will be discussed 
later in the paper where individual behavior of subjects 
will be considered. 
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TABLE 2A-ORDINARY LEAST-SQUARES TIMATION FTHE CONVERGENCE PROCESS 
Equation: Pi, = B,,D,(lIt) + . + B,KDK(1lt) + B2((t - 1)1t) + ui,. 
i-index of the experiment; t-period number; Pi,-average transaction price in period t of experiment i. Dj = 1 if i - 
j, 0 otherwise. ui, - N(0, s2). Dependent variable-Pi,. 
Experiment Independent variable Estimated coefficient Standard error t-statistics 
022894 B,, 50.32 2.86 17.58 
031694 B,2 21.07 3.03 6.95 
031794 B,3 44.35 2.86 15.50 
032494 B,4 39.02 2.82 13.82 
042894 B15 49.57 2.87 17.32 
050195 B,6 54.74 2.81 19.43 
050295 B,7 48.33 2.81 17.16 
050595 B18 49.47 2.84 17.57 
050995 Big 39.68 2.77 14.08 
B2 46.11 0.84 54.28 
Notes: Number of observations -49; R2-0.71. Standard error of the regression-3.38; Durbin-Watson statistics- 1.78. 
Mean of dependent variable-45.66. 
The effects of experience are reflected by 
the decisions of the 20 subjects who partici- 
pated in 0324 and 0509. The relevant data are 
in Table 3. All of these subjects had partici- 
pated as inexperienced subjects in earlier ex- 
periments. For each of these subjects the 
average of the final holdings of the last two 
periods (when inexperienced) was compared 
to the last two periods (when experienced). 
Six of the seven subjects who came close to 
the "boundaries" (bought or sold more than 
two-thirds of the theoretically predicted quan- 
tities) when inexperienced, kept that tendency 
when experienced. Secondly, 15 of 20 subjects 
under consideration increased the absolute 
values of their final-holding changes the sec- 
ond time of participation. On average, the net 
change in holdings was 10.6 when inexperi- 
enced, and 15.3 when experienced. Thus, the 
evidence for movement toward a competitive 
equilibrium allocation is stronger in markets 
in which subjects were experienced. 
In summary, price convergence receives sub- 
stantial support, while allocation data are less 
supportive of movement toward the competi- 
tive equilibria. Movement oward the extremes 
occurs, but in the USC experiments the move- 
ment is incomplete, resulting in volumes that 
are less than the competitive prediction. While 
the evidence is thus mixed, we conclude that a 
tendency of convergence toward a competitive 
equilibrium was observed across experiments. 
The next result states the implications of the 
particular competitive equilibrium observed, 
as related to the numbers of different ypes of 
preferences. It is here that observed market be- 
havior and the theory of markets are used to- 
gether to deduce the type of preference that 
must have existed in the subjects. 
RESULT 3: The number of risk-seeking sub- 
jects in the experiments was no less then the 
number of risk-averse and risk-neutral sub- 
jects combined. 
SUPPORT: 
Proposition B2 states that only in the cases 
in which the number of risk-seeking subjects is 
no less than the number of non-risk-seeking 
subjects can the competitive quilibrium price 
be at some level which is strictly lower than 50. 
Result 1 says that prices are below 50. Result 
2 states that the convergence was toward a 
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TABLE 2B-NUMBERS OF INDIVIDUALS WITH VARIOUS LEVELS OF PURCHASES AND SALES: 
AVERAGE OF LAST Two PERIODS, ALL EXPERIMENTS 
All experiments combined 
Final holdings 0-0.4 0.5-4 5-8 9-12 13-16 17-20 Total numbers 
BUYERS 4 2 5 7 8 14 40 
SELLERS 6 4 5 7 16 38 
competitive equilibrium. Thus, it is possible to 
apply Proposition B2 to the experimental data 
and conclude that the number of risk-seeking 
subjects in the experiments was no lower then 
the number of non-risk-seeking subjects. 
The conclusion is consistent with the dimin- 
ishing sensitivity axiom of prospect theory, 
which predicts such a behavior in losses. How- 
ever, the price equilibration across experi- 
ments, identified in the previous paragraphs, 
has one major implication, which is very im- 
portant for the discussion of the relevance of 
prospect theory for economics from a meth- 
odological point of view. Namely, equilibra- 
tion suggests that, contrary to prospect theory 
as advanced by psychologists, preferences ex- 
ist and do not exhibit labile properties that 
might result from multiple reference points or 
changes in reference points in the complex 
markets. This issue will be pursued toward the 
end of the results section. 
The next result evolves from an inquiry that 
has two forms. First, do the questionnaires 
used extensively in psychological studies lead 
to measurements of properties of people that 
will be manifest in market behavior? The sec- 
ond is a corollary to the first. Is risk seeking 
in the negatives a property of individual pref- 
erences or is it a property of the way that peo- 
ple think about things? Is it a property of 
preference or is it a property of the process of 
preference formation? As it turns out, the 
questionnaires have a biased property as a 
prediction of market behavior but, neverthe- 
less, provide strong predictive powers about 
such behavior. Thus, one cannot reject the no- 
tion that the questionnaires measured a prop- 
erty of preference as opposed to a feature of 
cognition. 
The analysis will consist of three steps. First, 
the subjects will be classified as RA or RS ac- 
cording to their behavior in the experiments. 
Secondly, the same classification will be com- 
pleted according to their answers to the ques- 
tionnaires. Comparison of two classifications 
will provide support for the statement of results. 
A classification of the subjects by their be- 
havior in the experiments is developed by using 
the equilibrium patterns suggested by the model. 
Subjects can be classified into three different cat- 
egories, according to their final holdings. Only 
two last periods of every experiment were used 
in the analysis. Data in Table 4A show the re- 
sults of such a classification. 
1. Risk seeking (RS) -This class contains 
subjects who satisfy the following condition: 
They moved at least halfway toward the "sell- 
ers' boundary" on average; i.e., they sold at 
least ten units of X on average in the last two 
periods of the experiment. 
2. Possibly risk averse (RA) -This class 
contains subjects who satisfy the following 
condition: They moved at least halfway to- 
ward the "buyers' boundary" on average; i.e., 
they bought at least ten units of X on average 
in the last two periods of the experiment. 
The competitive model predicts that in equi- 
librium, when the prices are sufficiently lower 
than the risk-neutral price, risk-seeking people 
can demonstrate the same behavior as risk- 
averse people: buying units of inventory. On the 
other hand, if a subject is on the seller's side of 
the market and prices are below 50, then that 
subject is exhibiting risk-seeking behavior. 
Thus, formally, the numbers in Table 4A rep- 
resent lower bounds of the numbers of the risk- 
seeking people in the experiments and the upper 
bounds of the numbers of the risk-averse 
subjects. 
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TABLE 3-COMPARISON OF THE NET CHANGES OF FINAL HOLDINGS (AVERAGE OF THE LAST TwO PERIODS) AND 
CLASSIFICATION RESULTS FOR THE SUBJECTS WHO PARTICIPATED IN Two EXPERIMENTS 
Inexperienced Experienced 
Net changes of Net changes of 
final holdings final holdings 
Subject# Experiment of inventory Classification Experiment of inventory Classification 
1 0316 6.5 0324 8.5 
2 0316 0.5 "?" 0324 0 T 
3 0316 10.5 RA 0324 12 RA 
4 0316 -5 "?" 0324 -19 RS 
5 0316 -3.5 "?" 0324 9.5 "?" 
6 0316 -3 "?" 0324 -15 RS 
7 0316 -1 "?" 0324 0 "?" 
8 0317 -13.5 RS 0324 -17 RS 
9 0317 -3 "?" 0324 11 RA 
10 0317 0 "?" 0324 10 RA 
1 1 0501 -13.5 RS 0509 20 RA 
12 0501 -12 RS 0509 31.5 RA 
13 0501 -12.5 RS 0509 -20 RS 
14 0501 -14 RS 0509 -20 RS 
15 0502 -17 RS 0509 20 RA 
16 0502 -20 RS 0509 20 RA 
17 0502 -19.5 RS 0509 -20 RS 
18 0502 20 RA 0509 19.5 RA 
19 0505 -20 RS 0509 -12.5 RS 
20 0505 -17.5 RS 0509 -18 RS 
3. "?"-It is hard to say about subjects. 
This class contains subjects who did not dem- 
onstrate a "consistent pattern" of behavior. In 
other words, these were subjects who: 
(i) May have been moving in a direction of 
the boundaries, but did not demonstrate 
any pattern of consistency. 
(ii) Were trading around the status quo, in- 
stead of moving toward some boundary, 
but showed no consistent behavior. 
(iii) Were not buying or selling anything at 
all. 
(iv) Demonstrated a mix of (i), (ii), and 
(iii). 
Notice that approximately two-thirds of all 
subjects (53 out of 82) were classified as RS or 
RA and the other one-third was classified as 
"?." Since, as discussed in the previous para- 
graphs, those subjects who were classified as RA 
could in fact be RS if prices were sufficiently 
low, the results of such a classification could be 
interpreted to be that there was no less than 50 
percent of the people in the experiments that 
were risk seeking. This classification is consistent 
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TABLE 4A-CLASSIFICATION OF THE SUBJECTS 
ACCORDING TO THEIR BEHAVIOR 
Experiment RA* RS** "9" 
0228 3 3 4 
0316 2 1 7 
0317 3 3 4 
0324 3 3 4 
0428 2 2 4 
0501 4 4 2 
0502 3 3 2 
0505 2 2 2 
0509 5 5 0 
Totals 27 26 29 
* These measures are upper bounds. 
** These measures are lower bounds. 
with the claim of Result 3 that risk seeking ac- 
counts for a substantial proportion of behavior. 
The classification provides a possible in- 
sight about the weaknesses in the support for 
equilibration. Recall from the support of Re- 
sult 2 that the total net volumes of trades were 
lower than predicted by the competitive 
model. Now it becomes clear that such a phe- 
nomena is likely due to the great number of 
subjects who were classified as "?." The com- 
mon feature of most of such subjects is that 
they did not move far from the status quo. In 
other words, they all had low net volumes 
across periods, or they were inconsistent 
across periods and, as a result, they could not 
be classified as RA or RS. Data in Table 1 
show that the net volumes were approximately 
10-50 percent lower than ones predicted by 
the model. On the other hand, one-third of sub- 
jects were classified as "?," thus providing 
support for the claim that the "?" subjects 
were responsible for low net volumes. 
A classification of the subjects according to 
their answers to the questionnaires was done. All 
of the subjects were asked to answer the follow- 
ing questions-What would you prefer to lose: 
(i) $500 for sure or $1,000 with probability 
0.5. 
(ii) $20 for sure or $40 with probability 0.5. 
(iii) $3,000 for sure or $4,000 with probabil- 
ity 0.8. 
(iv) $7.50 for sure or $15 with probability 
0.5. 
(v) $1 for sure or $2 with probability 0.5. 
According to their answers they were quali- 
fied using two different types of classifications. 
Type I classification: Risk averse-three or 
more answers "for sure"; risk seeking-three 
or more answers "'with probability = 
1/2." 
Type 2 classification: (According to the an- 
swers to single question), which one would 
you choose -losing $20 for sure or losing $40 
with a probability 1/2? 
Risk seeking-Would prefer to lose $40 
with probability = 1/2 instead of to lose $20 
for sure. 
Questionnaires were completed by all 82 
subjects who participated in the experiments. 
According to the type 1 criteria, 66 (80 percent) 
were "risk seeking" and 16 (20 percent) were 
"risk averse." According to the type 2 criteria, 
61 (74 percent) were "risk seeking" and 21 
(26 percent) were "risk averse." 
With the measurements above completed, 
the result can now be stated. The essence of 
the result is that the questionnaires have pre- 
dictive power about behavior in markets. 
RESULT 4: There is strong consistency be- 
tween answers to the questionnaires and 
experimental market behavior. However, the 
questionnaire may have a bias that overes- 
timates the number of risk-seeking individ- 
uals relative to the number of risk-averse 
individuals. 
SUPPORT: 
The numbers in Table 4B represent rela- 
tionships between the experimental data and 
the data from the questionnaires. If only sub- 
jects who were classified as RA or RS are 
considered, then the probability that a subject 
who appears to be RS according to the ques- 
tionnaires would demonstrate the same kind of 
behavior in the experiment (p (RSexp I RSquest) ) 
is equal to 0.65 (0.63 for type 2 classifi- 
cation). Similarly, p(RAexp I RSquest) = 0.35 
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(0.37), p(RAexp l RAquest ) = 0.87 (0.80), 
p(RSexp lRAquest) = 0.13 (0.20). Two conclu- 
sions follow about relevance of the question- 
naires for predicting market behavior. First, 
answers to the questionnaires do produce mea- 
surements that can be used as a rough predic- 
tion of the behavior in the context of operating 
markets, since the probability of consistent 
(with the answers) behavior is 0.73. Secondly, 
the likelihood of a deviation in the experiment 
from the answer given to the questionnaire is 
about three times for risk-seeking subjects 
(questionnaire) rather than for risk-averse 
ones (questionnaire). It is important to note 
that the results are the same for both types of 
classification. In other words, choice of either 
of the two different types of classification does 
not change the results. Finally, the fact that the 
questionnaire overestimated the number of 
RS-type behavior in the markets is consistent 
with the model, which claims that as prices fall 
below 50 the RS will begin to shift from sell- 
ing to buying. However, this aspect of the data 
will be discussed again as Conjecture 3. 
V. Results and Theoretical Coherence: 
Three Tests 
The results as reported go beyond a simple 
reporting of statistics. They embody an at- 
tempt to weave a sense in which the statistics 
are consistent with the principles that support 
"extended prospect theory" as integrated with 
the competitive model. Since the data do not 
perfectly fit the competitive model, as modi- 
fied to include the possibility of risk-seeking 
behavior in the negatives, there might be al- 
ternative explanations. In this section we dis- 
cuss additional experiments that explore three 
possible alternative explanations of the data. 
Space limitations prevent any detailed report- 
ing but these additional experiments can be 
used as some indication of the robustness of 
the major results reported in the body of the 
paper. These additional experiments will be 
referenced as "additional controls." 
The motivation for the first additional con- 
trol experiment was the fact that transaction 
prices in most experiments tend to be very 
close (a penny below) to the risk-neutral level 
TABLE 4B-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANSWERS TO THE 
QUESTIONNAIRES AND EXPERIMENTAL BEHAVIOR 
Type 1 classification 
More than two out of five answers of a particular type 
Type 2 classification (in parentheses) 
Based on the answer to the choice of loosing $20 for 
sure or $40 with p = I/2 
Risk seeking Risk averse 
in the in the 
questionnaires questionnaires 
Risk seeking in the 
experiment 17 (16) 2 (3) 
Risk averse in the 
experiment 9 (10) 13 (12) 
"?" in the 
experiment 20 (17) 1 (4) 
of 50. In view of such data, a possibility exists 
that the subjects were risk neutral and that 
transaction costs accounted for the observed 
lack of accuracy of the model. To test this hy- 
pothesis (risk neutrality) an additional control 
experiment (0509) was conducted. This ex- 
periment involved a special selection of sub- 
jects from those that had participated 
previously. Subjects were chosen that had pre- 
viously demonstrated risk-seeking behavior 
according to the model. Aside from the selec- 
tion of subjects, the experiment was an exact 
replica of all previous experiments. All sub- 
jects who participated in experiment 0509 had 
already participated in one of the previous Cal- 
ifornia Institute of Technology experiments: 
0501, 0502, or 0505. All but one of the sub- 
jects chosen for 0509 were those that could be 
classified as risk seeking as a result of their 
previous participation. Data in Table 1 show 
that in the three previous experiments (0501, 
0502, and 0505) prices were close to the risk- 
neutral level of 50. Thus, if the subjects were 
risk neutral then the transaction prices in the 
experiment 0509 should be also near 50. On 
the other hand, if the existence of risk-seeking 
individuals interpretation of the data is correct, 
then, as the model implies, the prices in ex- 
periment 0509 should be significantly below 
50. 
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The last column in Table 1 presents trans- 
action prices for the additional control exper- 
iment 0509. It is clear that the prices were not 
only below 50 but are far below (about 20 
percent) the prices in the experiments 0501, 
0502, and 0505. Thus the prices are out of the 
range of any previously observed transactions 
costs deviation from equilibrium. Since mar- 
ket prices were substantially below the risk- 
neutral equilibrium, the model implies that 
there are at least as many risk-seeking subjects 
as there are risk-averse and risk-neutral sub- 
jects combined, so the hypothesis about gen- 
eral risk neutrality can be rejected. 
A second additional control experiment 
(0516) was conducted to explore the idea that 
the observed risk-seeking behavior could be 
explained as a property of general risk-seeking 
preference, as opposed to simply risk seeking 
in losses. If subjects change their risk-seeking 
behavior to risk-averse behavior when the 
experimental conditions are formulated in 
terms of gains as opposed to losses, then the 
hypothesis of general risk-seeking preference 
can be rejected. Does the risk-seeking behav- 
ior observed simply reflect the attitudes of in- 
dividuals that prefer risk taking in general, or 
is it the case that preferences are different for 
gains as opposed to losses? The test was per- 
formed using an experiment with a translation 
of the origin of the payoffs to a "gains" 
environment. 
First, subjects were paid $10 up front and 
were given 1000 units of money (M) and 20 
units of inventory (X) as initial holdings. Sec- 
ondly, their incentives to trade were formu- 
lated in terms of potential gains: 
Total Gain = Gain A + Gain B 
Gain A = ((I / 100)m) and 
Gain B = (0{ Prob 1/2 } or ( 100 cents) { Prob 
1/2}). 
Thus, the purchase of a unit of X is simply 
the purchase of a lottery that yields a 50:50 
chance between 100 cents and 0. Note that for 
both types of design (losses and gains) the ex 
ante expected amounts of money a subject 
could earn were the same. Thus, since the final 
states of the world are the same under both 
conditions, stable preferences over final states 
of the world should produce behavior that is 
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FIGURE 2D. EXPERIMENT 0516 
nine subjects who were used in this second 
control experiment had participated in the first 
additional control experiment 0509. (One of 
the ten subjects that participated in 0509 could 
not return for the experiment 0516). Recall, 
these subjects when participating in experi- 
ment 0509 demonstrated clear risk-seeking be- 
havior in losses as they had done in the 
previous experiments. Therefore, if no differ- 
ences exist for the subjects between losses and 
gains, one would also expect to observe risk- 
seeking behavior in the "gains" and thus 
prices should be above the "expected value." 
Prices above the risk-neutral level of 50 would 
reflect the buying efforts of risk-seeking indi- 
viduals who drive the price up because they 
enjoy the variance in wealth. On the other 
hand, if the subjects have asymmetric risk at- 
titudes in the gains and losses, then the sub- 
jects would switch to the risk-averse behavior 
when the lotteries are formulated in terms of 
gains. As a consequence, the transaction prices 
in the second additional control experiment 
(0516) would be below the risk-neutral level 
of 50. 
Figure 2D presents time series of transaction 
prices for the second additional control exper- 
iment (0516). The horizontal line corresponds 
to the risk-neutral level of 50 cents. Notice that 
all transaction prices are below 50.8 There are 
8 (Period, average price, standard deviation, volume): 
(0,45, 2.15, 51), (1,47, 1.34, 81), (2, 48, 0.83, 70), (3, 
48, 1.28, 80), (4, 48, 0.83, 80), (5, 48, 0.5, 80), (6, 48, 
0.46, 80), (7, 48, 0.48, 80). 
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an odd number of agents and if more than half 
are risk seeking then the prices must necessar- 
ily be above the fair lottery price of 50. Thus, 
the market measure suggests risk aversion on 
the part of subjects as opposed to risk seeking. 
This asymmetry in behavior is supported at the 
individual level. Three of the four subjects 
who demonstrated risk-averse behavior in 
0516 (the gains) by selling the lottery at prices 
below the risk-neutral price had exhibited 
strong risk-seeking tendencies by selling in- 
surance at a price below the risk-neutral prices, 
when participating in 0509 (the loss). These 
individuals exhibited clear asymmetric behav- 
ior by switching to risk-averse behavior when 
the market consists of the same lotteries with 
the expected loss now being a gain.9 Thus, the 
hypothesis that the subjects were risk seeking 
in general and exhibited no asymmetric be- 
havior, can be rejected. 
A glance at the time series of all experi- 
ments suggests the motivation for a third set 
of additional control experiments. Notice that 
prices in all experiments tend to be below the 
equilibrium value of the model. This suggests 
the hypothesis that something about the ex- 
periments, unrelated to risk preferences, 
caused the markets to converge from below. 
A third set of four additional control experi- 
ments were performed but are not reviewed 
here in detail. The purpose of the experiments 
was to control for the hypothesis that the "nat- 
ural path" of convergence of any market in 
these environments is from "below." These 
experiments were identical to the other exper- 
iments in the loss domain except the numeraire 
was switched from money to the lottery and 
the units were changed to accommodate the 
switch.'0 If risk-seeking behavior is present 
then prices should be above the equilibrium 
price of 200. Thus, the same theory of risk 
seeking that predicted below risk-neutral 
prices now predicts prices above the risk- 
neutral equilibrium price level. 
Four experiments were conducted with in- 
experienced and then experienced subjects. 
Because this switch in numeraire was evi- 
dently difficult for subjects, the processing and 
analysis of the data require more space than is 
available in this paper. However, the conclu- 
sion from analysis is that with experienced 
subjects some support exists for the presence 
of risk-preferring subjects in this "inverted" 
environment. These data are not conclusive 
but they do help to reject any presumption that 
for some reason prices are always below risk- 
neutral levels whether in the gains or losses. 
Prices of money in terms of the "insurance," 
when experienced people were used, tended to 
be above the risk-neutral levels. 
A paradox can be observed in the data. On 
one hand, the individuals selected for experi- 
ment 0509 continued to exhibit risk-seeking 
behavior throughout the second experience. 
On the other hand, the data suggest an evolu- 
tion of risk attitudes when experience becomes 
a factor. In other words, for many subjects, the 
risk attitudes after experience might be differ- 
ent from those initially. For example, Figures 
2A, 2B, and 2C show that in most of the ex- 
periments price convergence was occurring in 
the training periods. The early prices were 
consistently lower, suggesting that people 
were becoming more risk averse as they 
gained experience (and also faced actual pay- 
offs). The following two conjectures represent 
an attempt to approach the problem of chang- 
ing behavior with experience. The conjectures 
should not be interpreted as results but rather 
as a starting point of a discussion about this 
complex issue. 
'Because prices are endogenous, the model itself in- 
dicates that market experiments of the type studied here 
can only yield limited opportunities to classify individuals 
according to preferences. Three individuals who were sell- 
ers in the loss and sellers in the gain clearly exhibited the 
asymmetry of preferences suggested by extended prospect 
theory. One individual, a buyer in loss and a buyer in gain, 
exhibited behavior that was consistent with asymmetric 
preferences but, of course, could also have been consis- 
tently risk averse. Two individuals who were sellers in the 
loss and buyers in the gain were consistent with asym- 
metric preferences but are also consistent with general risk 
seeking. Three individuals were buyers in the loss and 
buyers in the gains and thus cannot be classified at all since 
they are consistent with all modes of preferences. 
'lmo = 2000, xo = 10; Loss A = (O{Prob 1/2) or 
$40 - (1/100)m{Prob 1/2)), Loss B = $20 - x. The 
risk-neutral price of x in terms of m is 200. 
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CONJECTURE 1: Support of specific impli- 
cations of the loss-aversion axiom of prospect 
theory, such as an "endowment effect,'" 
"status quo bias," or "trade-off vs. improve- 
ment" is stronger in the experiments involving 
inexperienced subjects and disappears with 
experience. 
SUPPORT: 
The conjecture is a direct implication of the 
data presented in Table 3. The source of sup- 
port is a comparison of the behavior of the 
subjects who participated in the experiments 
0316, 0317, 0501, 0502, and 0505 as inexpe- 
rienced subjects, with their behavior when 
they participated in the experiments 0324 and 
0509. The latter behavior was substantially 
different from the former. Such a difference in 
behavior of the same people participating in 
the same experiment suggests that experience 
matters. 
As was discussed in the support of Result 2, 
in the first set of experiments (subjects were 
inexperienced) the final holdings of eight of 
20 subjects were near the origin (less than 10 
units were traded), implying status quo bias. 
In other words, the status quo was the chosen 
option for the subjects. At the same time, how- 
ever, the phenomena cannot be due to the 
status quo bias as derived from prospect the- 
ory. At the prices that existed in these markets, 
if people are risk seeking (as they must be un- 
der the conditions of prospect theory from 
which the status quo bias is derived), the com- 
petitive equilibrium has individuals only on 
the "boundaries." Thus, while a status quo 
bias is observed it cannot be due to prospect 
theory. At the same time, in the second set of 
experiments (subjects were experienced) the 
final holdings of only four of 20 subjects were 
near the origin, implying "boundary" final 
holdings as predicted by the competitive 
model and in agreement with other experi- 
ments. Moreover, 15 of the 20 subjects in- 
creased the absolute values of their final 
holdings during their second experiment. The 
conclusion is that inexperienced subjects in the 
experiments demonstrated a tendency to make 
very few changes in their holdings. With ex- 
perience and understanding, their behavior 
changed. Thus, degree of experience and not 
a status quo bias derived from prospect theory 
accounts for their behavior. 
The conjecture above suggests that when peo- 
ple do not feel confident about their understand- 
ing of a situation they will be conservative and 
choose inaction over action. It is possible to use 
extended prospect theory to explain such phe- 
nomena. The explanation could go as follows. 
A natural feature of uncertainty, as opposed to 
risk, is the imagined existence of negative pros- 
pects that are possibly weighted so high that in- 
action results. With exposure to the decision 
environment comes a better understanding and 
as a consequence the imagined, possibly nega- 
tive prospects disappear and the other features 
of the decision process emerge. While this ex- 
planation is crude, it appears that a modification 
of extended prospect theory is necessary for the 
last result to be explained. 
The discussion and results above hold im- 
plications for the nature of circumstances un- 
der which real prospect theory can be applied. 
The real prospect theory (and not the extended 
prospect theory examined here) is about a de- 
cision process. A natural question to pose is if 
the axioms/laws of the decision process have 
a change in nature, or evolve to take different 
forms as experience and understanding takes 
place. The conjecture developed next suggests 
that some of the central phenomena identified 
by prospect theory are not stable features of 
human choice behavior. They diminish with 
experience and, perhaps, with reflection. 
CONJECTURE 2: With experience, risk 
seeking in the losses evolves into either risk- 
neutral or risk-averse behavior. 
SUPPORT: 
Price convergence from below in most ex- 
periments (Table 1) suggests that the inci- 
dence of risk-seeking behavior is getting 
weaker as the experiment continues. The 
competitive model implies (Propositions 4- 
6), that the more RS subjects are in the sys- 
tem the less will be the equilibrium price and 
the more RA subjects are in the system the 
higher will be the equilibrium. Table 1 
shows that the prices were consistently in- 
creasing in seven out of nine experiments. 
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Although it is impossible to claim that risk- 
seeking behavior always disappears with ex- 
perience, obvious tendencies towards the 
diminution of risk seeking were observed in 
four experiments. 
The above conjectures are of potential im- 
portance because they help isolate the nature 
of the decision process and its possible rela- 
tionship to properties of an individual. Con- 
vergence in economic environments seems to 
occur at many different levels. Clearly, prices 
and quantities have a convergence property. 
However, individual decision rules seem to 
evolve and individual understanding of a sit- 
uation and the attitudes of other individuals 
seem to undergo a transformation during the 
course of decisions and market activity. 
A hypothesis/philosophy has been advanced 
to describe this evolution, called the discovered 
preference hypothesis (Plott, 1996), and while 
that hypothesis is so simple that it is not likely 
to survive close examination, the above two con- 
jectures seem to be part of a pattern that the dis- 
covered preference hypothesis was advanced to 
capture. The idea is that the individuals have a 
consistent set of preferences over states but such 
preferences only become known to the individ- 
ual with thought and experience. Individuals at 
first exhibit a type of myopia, choosing in a 
somewhat impulsive way reflecting their im- 
mediate perceptions of their interests. With ex- 
perience, behavior moves toward patterns of 
choice behavior typical of the predictions of 
classical preference theory. Thus, when individ- 
uals are first given questions, they are character- 
ized by a type of confusion. As they begin to 
formulate decisions in this state they are influ- 
enced by "frames" in much the way that pros- 
pect theory asserts. As an understanding of the 
context evolves, the manifestation of the under- 
lying preferences becomes more clearly observ- 
able in the data and decisions approach those 
predicted by the classical theory of choice and 
preference. 
A final conjecture is offered about the re- 
lationship between the methodology of ques- 
tionnaires as a research tool and the creation 
of experimental markets. It rests on the fun- 
damental assumption that preferences do exist 
in the classical sense of economics, and that 
the preferences are reflected in individual 
choice behavior. 
CONJECTURE 3: The questionnaires have 
a bias that overstate the number of risk- 
seeking individuals relative to the number of 
risk-averse individuals. 
The observation that motivates this conjec- 
ture is the nature of the error rate of risk seek- 
ing as measured by the questionnaire. A total 
of 62 people participated as inexperienced 
subjects. Of these, 46 were RS according to 
the questionnaire and 16 were RA. Subjects 
responding as RA in the questionnaire (15) 
were more likely to behave RA in the experi- 
ment (12/15 inexperienced) than were sub- 
jects responding as RS in the questionnaire 
(46) likely to behave RS in the experiment 
(17/46 inexperienced). The asymmetry is 
clear. Of course, as was mentioned in the dis- 
cussion of Result 4, the model suggests that at 
low prices some of the RS will turn to behavior 
that cannot be distinguished from RA behavior 
so these statistics alone might not be so sup- 
portive of the conjecture. However, additional 
support comes from the asymmetry of the be- 
havior of those who could not be classified in 
the experiments (designated as "?" ). The 
subjects who were RS in the questionnaire ex- 
hibited a much greater tendency to be "?" in 
the markets (20/46 inexperienced) than did 
the subjects that were RA according to the 
questionnaire (1 / 15 inexperienced). Thus, the 
bias exists in the form of the ability to connect 
subjects that answered the questionnaire as RS 
with subsequent behavior that would be diffi- 
cult to classify. That difficulty does not exist 
with subjects that were RA, according to the 
questionnaire. 
Of course, the idea of bias of the question- 
naire approach is only a conjecture. The 
explanation could reside in the nature of this 
particular questionnaire (see Camerer, 1995) 
for references to the literature in which the 
properties of such instruments are studied. Or, 
the asymmetries could be due to the method 
of classification based on behavior in the ex- 
perimental markets. The data reported here 
from these experiments do not seem to have 
the capacity to resolve the issues. 
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VI. Conclusions 
This research began with questions moti- 
vated by psychological research. Prospect the- 
ory has had a considerable impact on the 
decision literature. The question posed by the 
research reported here was whether or not the 
predictions of an "extended prospect theory" 
could find support in markets. 
Exchange economies were created in which 
only losses could occur. Preferences over losses 
were not controlled by the unusual methodology 
in which preferences are induced. Instead, the 
objective was to determine if the "preferences 
revealed" by market actions had properties that 
one might expect from having studied the 
psychological-based literature. 
Risk-seeking behavior in the loss domain was 
observed in the markets studied. Its existence 
lends support to two fundamental properties of 
prospect theory. First, since risk-averse behavior 
has been widely documented in the positive do- 
main in experimental markets, we can conclude 
that there is an asymmetry between gains and 
losses. A single control experiment reported in 
the paper further supports a pattern of asym- 
metry and that asymmetry is a fundamental 
property of prospect theory. As a corollary, we 
can conclude that there are such things as 
"gains" and "losses," as opposed to only "fi- 
nal states of the world," the existence of which 
implies the existence of another fundamental 
feature of prospect theory, a reference point. Fi- 
nally, we can conclude that risk seeking in the 
losses is a frequent occurrence. It was a property 
of over one-third of the total of all people ob- 
served in these markets. 
The patterns of results lend strong support to 
features of prospect theory as a description of a 
decision process. The more fundamental ques- 
tion to be posed is whether individuals are 
ONLY a bundle of decision processes: rules of 
thumb that have no necessary relationship to an 
underlying attitude or coherence of an underly- 
ing preference. First, it should be emphasized 
that a pattern of coherence is evident in the mar- 
kets. Convergence toward competitive equilibria 
occurred. It follows that the "reference point" 
was not so subject to moment-to-moment 
"framing" that preferences became so labile 
that they had no coherence. These markets be- 
haved as if a large proportion of individuals had 
reasonably coherent and stable preferences. Of 
course, a large proportion of these preferences 
were exactly of the form that one would- have 
expected from a reading of prospect theory, as 
stated by the "extended prospect theory." Psy- 
chologists have long maintained that a relevant 
domain of prospect theory is "one-time deci- 
sions." The results reported here question 
whether or not that is the only circumstance in 
which the theory applies. The conjectures re- 
ported here suggest that the first impulses ex- 
perienced by a decision maker would seem to 
be described by the theory. Features of prospect 
theory are present when people are confused. 
The support for the status quo bias is an exam- 
ple. The difference in behavior of those that give 
a risk-seeking response to a questionnaire as op- 
posed to those that give a risk-averse response 
is another body of evidence that conservatism is 
a consequence of incomplete understanding. Af- 
ter all, the theory is about a process of decision, 
so it is not particularly surprising that its features 
are most evident in situations in which individ- 
uals are involved in a process of decision. 
Whether or not "considered opinions" are 
governed by the same processes as are imme- 
diate impulses involves deeper and more com- 
plex experiments than have been performed to 
date. The final conjecture of the paper is that 
some of the features of prospect theory will dis- 
appear with practice or perhaps even with re- 
flection. In particular, the conjecture is that risk 
seeking in the losses is a property of inexperi- 
ence that will give way to risk-averse behavior. 
Of course, one implication of the conjecture is 
that the concept and importance of a reference 
point will also fade. The idea that the evolution 
of attitudes has a direction toward the more 
classical lines of preference theory has been vig- 
orously criticized (Kahneman, 1996). Neverthe- 
less, the data presented here provide additional 
support for such a presumption. 
APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You are about to participate in an experiment. 
For your agreement o participate you will be paid 
$60. The structure of the experiment is such that 
you will be exposed to a possible money loss. 
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The amount of loss will depend upon your deci- 
sions and the outcome of the lottery as will be 
explained in the following paragraphs. 
Your total money loss will consist of two 
different types of losses: 
Total Loss = Loss A + Loss B. 
Loss A will be determined as $20 minus 1/ 
100 times your A-Cent holdings. 
Loss B will be determined by the outcome of 
a lottery. The outcome of the lottery is deter- 
mined by a single draw from an urn that contains 
an equal number of RED and BLACK balls. 
If the drawn ball is a RED one then your 
Loss B is zero. 
If the drawn ball is a BLACK one then your 
Loss B will be determined as $40 minus your 
B-Dollar holdings. 
The experiment will consist of a series of pe- 
riods. At the beginning of each period you will 
be given 1000 A-Cents and 20 B-Dollars. The A- 
Cents reduce your money Loss A. The B-Dollars 
reduce your money Loss B should a BLACK ball 
be drawn, but of course B-Dollars are worth noth- 
ing to you should a RED ball be drawn. During 
the period you will be able to change the nature 
of your Losses by exchanging A-Cents for B- 
Dollars and B-Dollars for A-Cents. 
Each 1 B-Dollar held at the end of a period 
reduces your B Loss by $1 should a BLACK 
ball be drawn, and each 100 A-Cents reduces 
your A Loss by $1. 
As you may have noticed, the chance that 
the drawn ball is BLACK is 1/2 or 50 percent 
and the chance that the drawn ball is RED is 
also 1/2 or 50 percent. You may also have 
noticed that A-Cents are always worth some- 
thing to you (100 A-Cents reduces $1 of A 
Loss not depending on the outcome of the lot- 
tery) and that you need B-Dollars only in 50 
percent of cases (1 B-Dollar reduces $1 of B 
Loss only if a BLACK ball is drawn). 
As described above, the maximum possible 
A Loss is $20 (happens if you have no A- 
Cents at all), and the maximum possible B 
Loss is $40 (happens if you have no B-Dollars 
at all and the BLACK ball is drawn). That 
implies that the maximum amount of A-Cents 
you may want to have is 2000 A-Cents and B- 
Dollars is 40 B-Dollars. 
The A-Cents that you have at any time are 
found in the CASH ON HAND space on your 
computer screen. The B-Dollars that you have 
are found in the INVENTORY space on your 
computer screen. So if you buy one unit of 
INVENTORY at a price P, you give up P A- 
Cents and you acquire 1 B-Dollar. If you sell 
one unit of INVENTORY at a price P you 
acquire P A-Cents and you give up 1 B-Dollar. 
The CASH ON HAND (A-Cents) and IN- 
VENTORY (B-Dollars) held at the end of a 
period will dictate the terms of your lottery 
that resulted from the trades you made during 
the period. These dictate the nature of your 
loss. Nothing can be transferred from one pe- 
riod to another. The trading in each period 
yields the terms of a specific lottery. 
The results of only one period will be used to 
determine your Loss. At the end of the experi- 
ment a special lottery will be held to determine 
which of several periods it will be. In this special 
lottery each period will be given equal weight. 
EXAMPLE 1 
Suppose for example that you made no 
trades at all during the period. So your final 
holdings are the same as initial holdings: 1000 
A-Cents (CASH ON HAND) and 20 B- 
Dollars INVENTORY). 
If a BLACK ball is drawn you would have 
lost: 
-------- A Loss -------------------------- 
$20 - 1/100 x 1000 (the A-Cent held) 
plus 
--------- B Loss ------ 
$40 - $20 (the B-Dollars held) = $30. 
If a RED ball is drawn you would have lost: 
-------- A Loss -------------------------- 
$20 - 1/100 X 1000 (the A-Cent held) 
plus 
--------- B Loss --------- 
$0 = $10. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 19:10:47 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
824 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 1997 
After each period you will have to fill out 
the RECORD OF LOSSES enclosed in your 
instruction folder. For example if in some 
period you acted as described in Example 1, 
your RECORD OF LOSSES should be as 
follows. 
Your B-Dollar Your A-Cent Your B Loss Your A Loss Total Loss if Total Loss if 
holding holding the ball is the ball is 
$20 minus BLACK RED 
(Cash on $40 minus #A-Cents Real Total 
Period # (Inventory) Hand) #B-Dollars 100 (A + B) (A) Loss 
0 Beginning 20 1000 $20 $10 $30 $10 
0 End 20 1000 $20 $10 $30 $10 
EXAMPLE 2 
Suppose now that during the period you have 
sold 15 B-dollars at price 60 each. That means 
that your final holdings are: 5 B-Dollars (20 - 
15) and 1900 A-Cents (1000 + 15 X 60). 
If a BLACK ball is drawn then you would 
have lost: 
$20- 19 (A Loss) + $40-5 (B Loss) 
= $36 (Total Loss). 
If a RED ball is drawn then you would have 
lost: 
$20- 19 (A Loss) + $0 (B Loss) 
= $1 (Total Loss). 
Your RECORD OF LOSSES in this case 
should be filled out as follows. 
Your B-Dollar Your A-Cent Your B Loss Your A Loss Total Loss if Total Loss if 
holding holding the ball is the ball is 
$20 minus BLACK RED 
(Cash on $40 minus #A-Cents Real Total 
Period # (Inventory) Hand) #B-Dollars 100 (A + B) (A) Loss 
0 Beginning 20 1000 $20 $10 $30 $10 
0 End 5 1900 $35 $1 $36 $1 
The above the example shows how you may 
change the nature of your losses by selling B- 
Dollars compared to making no actions at all 
(Example 1). Namely, in the Example 1 your 
gains were the following: 
50% chance of losing $30 (a BLACK ball is 
drawn); 
50% chance of losing $10 (a RED ball is 
drawn) . 
After selling 15 B-Dollars at the price of 50 
each (Example 2) your losses are determined as: 
50% chance of losing $36 (a BLACK ball is 
drawn); 
50% chance of losing $1 (a RED ball is 
drawn). 
Now you can see how your actions during 
the experiment may change the nature of your 
losses. 
EXAMPLE 3 
Suppose that during the period you bought 
20 B-Dollars at a price 40 each. That means 
that your final holdings are: 200 A-Cents 
(1000 - 20 x 40) and 40 B-Dollars (20 + 
20). 
If a BLACK ball is drawn you would have 
lost: 
$20 - 2 (A Loss) + $40 - 40 (B Loss) 
=$18 (Total Loss). 
If a RED ball is drawn you would have lost: 
$20-2 (A Loss) + $0 (B Loss) 
= $18 (Total Loss) . 
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So your losses in this example are the 50% chance of losing $18 (a RED ball is 
following: drawn). 
50% chance of losing $18 (a BLACK ball Your RECORD OF LOSSES should be 
is drawn); filled out as follows. 
Your B-Dollar Your A-Cent Your B Loss Your A Loss Total Loss if Total Loss if 
holding holding the ball is the ball is 
$20 minus BLACK RED 
(Cash on $40 minus #A-Cents Real Total 
Period# (Inventory) Hand) #B-Dollars 100 (A + B) (A) Loss 
0 Beginning 20 1000 $20 $10 $30 $10 
0 End 40 200 $0 $18 $18 $18 
Compare it to the losses from Examples 1 
and 2. 
Exercise 1 
Suppose that during the period you sold 18 
B-Dollars at the price of 55 each. 
Compute: 
(i) Your final B-Dollar holding 
(ii) Your final A-Cent holding 
(iii) Your A Loss 
(iv) Your B Loss 
(v) Your Total Loss if a BLACK ball is 
drawn 
(vi) Your Total Loss if a RED ball is 
drawn 
So your final lottery is: 
50% chance of losing 
50% chance of losing 
(vii) Fill out the RECORD OF LOSSES 
for the above case. 
Exercise 2 
Repeat Exercise 1 for the case when during 
a period you bought 10 B-Dollars at the price 
of 45 each. 
(i) Your final B-Dollar holding 
(ii) Your final A-Cent holding 
(iii) Your A Loss 
(iv) Your B Loss 
(v) Your Total Loss if a BLACK ball is 
drawn 
(vi) Your Total Loss if a RED ball is 
drawn 
So your final lottery is: 
50% chance of losing 
50% chance of losing 
(vii) Fill out the RECORD OF LOSSES 
for the above case. 
APPENDIX B 
PROPOSITION B 1: Consider a utility func- 
tion satisfying the general assumptions (a), 
(b), and (c) in the text (page 807). If 
1. U'(z) > O for any z; 
2. U"(z) < O for any z < O if a subject is risk 
averse in losses; 
3. U"(z) > Ofor any z < O if a subject is risk 
seeking in losses; 
4. U'(z) = 1 and U"(z) = 0 if a subject is 
risk neutral, 
then the indifference curves of the final hold- 
ings of M and X satisfy the following proper- 
ties (where subscripts represent derivatives): 
1. Xm < Ofor any m: 0 < m < 20; 
2. xmm > 0 (Convex) if a subject is risk averse 
in negatives; 
3. x4 < 0 (Concave) if a subject is risk seek- 
ing in negatives; 
4. x' = -0.02 and x4m = 0 if a subject is risk 
neutral. 
PROOF: 
The indifference curves are determined by 
the following equation: 
(Bi) 0.5U(m/100 - 20) + 0.5U(m/100 
- 20 + x - 40)= C, 
where 0 < m < 2000 and 0 < x are the money 
M and the inventory X holdings, respectively, 
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by the end of a period. Equation (B1 ) defines 
an implicit function x = x(m, c) representing 
an indifference curve. To determine the shape 
of the indifference curves x' and x"m are to 
be computed. By differentiating both sides by 
m we get: 
(B2) 0.01U'(m/100 - 20) + U'(m/100 
+ X - 60)(x4 + 0.01) = 0, 
(B3) x = -0.01 - 0.0lU'(m/l00 
- 20)IU'(x + m/100 - 60). 
Differentiating both sides of (B2) by m 
implies: 
(B4) 0.01U"(mI100 - 20) 
+ l00U"(m/100 + x - 60) 
X (X4 + 1)2 
+ l00U'(m/100 + x - 60)x4mm 
=0. 
Substitution of (B3) into (B4) gives: 
(B5) Xm = (-10-4)/U'(mllOO + x-60) 
x [U"(m/100-20) 
+ U"(ml 100 + x-60) 
x { U' (m/100 - 20) 
- U"(m/100+x-60) }2]. 
By substituting into (B5) the properties of 
the derivatives listed in the hypothesis of the 
proposition, the first three conclusions of the 
proposition follow immediately. One may also 
notice that for all types of subjects 
(B6) U'(x = 40, m = 0)= -0.02 and 
-0.01 ? U'(x, m = 20) < -0.02. 
From this the fourth conclusion of the prop- 
osition follows. 
LEMMA B 1: Let A, S, and N denote the 
numbers of risk-averse, risk-seeking, and risk- 
neutral subjects, respectively. If there are only 
risk-averse subjects in the experiment (S = 
N = 0) then under the conditions on the pref- 
erences and identical initial endowments a 
competitive equilibrium always exists at a 
price strictly higher than 50. 
PROOF: 
Formally, a competitive equilibrium exists 
in the system if and only if there is a price pe 
at which total excess demand [D(p) = 
Y2Qi (p), where Qi (p) is an individual excess 
demand] has a value of 0, D(pe) = 0. For 
every i, since all subjects are risk averse, 
Qi(50) = 20 > 0 and Qi(+oo) < 0, and 
D(50) > O and D(+oo) < 0. 
The continuity of Qi (p) implies the con- 
tinuity of D(p), which in turn implies that 
there exists p * such that 50 < p * < +oo and 
D(p*) = 0. 
LEMMA B2: (S = 0) If there are no risk- 
seeking subjects in the system then under the 
conditions on the preferences and identical 
initial endowments a competitive equilibrium 
always exists. Equilibrium price is higher than 
50 if A > N and equal to 50 otherwise. 
PROOF: 
For the risk-neutral subjects the excess de- 
mand function takes values in the interval 
from -20 to +20 (Qi (50) = [ -20; 20 ]). For 
the risk-averse subjects Qi (50) = 20. Thus at 
price p = 50 the total excess demand corre- 
spondence is equal to the interval [dl; d2.] 
That is D(50) = [di; d2], where d, = -20N + 
20A and d2 = 20(A + N). If A > N then 
0 <dl <d2 and the proposition is reduced to 
the Lemma BI. If A ? N then di < 0 d24. 
The lemma is proved, since at the price of 50 
the total excess demand function has a value 
of 0 (0 E D(50) = [dl; d2]). 
PROPOSITION B2: Under the conditions on 
preferences, identical initial endowments and 
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even number of subjects, a competitive equi- 
librium always exists. Equilibrium price is 
lower than or equal to 50 if S 2 A + N and 
greater than or equal to 50 if S < A + N. 
Moreover, if S > A + N then equilibrium 
price is strictly lower than 50. 
PROOF: 
Notation: 
H = {PI, , PL } - set points of disconti- 
nuity of D(p) (Pj < 50 for any j and L < S ) 
in increasing order. nj is the number of the 
individuals whose demand is discontinuous at 
pj H r. We need to prove that there exist a p * 
such that D(p * ) = 0. 
Let us note that D(oo) < 0. 
First, let us determine the total excess de- 
mand D(p) at p = 50. By definition D(p) = 
XQi (p). For the risk-neutral subjects Qi (50) 
E [-20; 20]. For the risk-averse subjects 
Qi (50) = 20. For the risk-seeking subjects 
Qi (50) = -20. Repeating the similar argu- 
ment in Lemma B2, at p = 50 D(50) = [dl; 
d2] where d, = -20(N + S) + 20A, d2 = 
-20S + 20(A + N). 
If d2 > 0(S < A + N) then for the two 
possible cases (d, < 0 < d2 and 0 < d, < d2) 
the proof is similar to the proofs of the Lem- 
mas B 1 and B2. The equilibrium price is 
greater than or equal to 50. 
If d2 = 0 (S = A + N), then 50, there exist 
multiple equilibria. First, notice that 50 is an 
equilibrium price. 
Second, if the price is above 50 then supply 
is always greater than demand. Therefore no 
equilibria exist. On the other hand, if the price 
falls a little below 50 then demand is still equal 
to supply. This continues until all risk-seeking 
people are willing to sell. Therefore there ex- 
ists an interval [a; 50] of equilibrium prices, 
where 0 < a < 50. 
Finally, let us consider the case when d2 < 
0; i.e., S > A + N. 
The correspondence D(p) is strictly posi- 
tive at the price equal to 0 (D(0) = 20(N + 
S + A)), strictly negative at the price equal to 
50 (D(50) = [di; d2] and d2 < 0) and has L 
points of discontinuity at the interval [0; 50]. 
It will be shown that the set of the values of 
D(p) on the above interval is a set of S + 1 
consecutive integers from 40K, to 4OKL, 
where K, = (N + A + S)/2 (positive) and KL 
= (A + N - S)/2 (negative). 
Second, let us construct D(p) = XQi (p) for 
p E [0, 50). For the risk-averse and risk- 
neutral subjects Qi (p) = 20 if p E [0, 50). 
Thus, the only subjects whose excess demand 
functions have different values in the interval 
are risk-seeking ones. For a risk-seeking sub- 
jectQi(p) = {20ifp <pj, -20ifp >pj, 20 
or -20 if p = pi }, where pj E fl. This implies 
that D(p) is constant in any open interval (pj; 
pj +, ). One may notice that there are L + 1 
such intervals, since there are L points of dis- 
continuity. Let us denote D(p) = 40K; if p E 
(pj -_; pj). At p = pj, nj of risk-seeking sub- jects are indifferent between +20 and -20. 
Thus, the total excess demand of those nj sub- 
jects at the price p equal to pj is the set of 
nj + l integers: { 20nj, 20nj - 40, ... , -20n; } . 
Moreover, the total excess demand of the same 
nj subjects is equal to 20nj if p is less than pj 
and is equal to 
-20nj if p is greater than pj. 
The total excess demand of everybody else is 
constant near pj. This implies that D(pj - e) - 
D(pj + e) = 40(Kj+l - Kj) = 20nj - (-20) 
nj = 40nj. Thus all Kj can be determined by 
induction. Formally: 
If p t fl;p1_I,pj E fl,p E (p_I ;pj) then 
D(p) = 40Kj,j = 1 L, 
where Kj is defined as follows: 
K, = (A + N + S)/2 [Positive integer, 
since there is an even number of subjects] 
Kj>t = Kj - nj- 
If p e fl;p = pj, then D(p) ={40Kj, 
40(Kj- 1), ...,40Kj+, ). 
Thus at the interval [0; 50) D(p) has the 
following values: 
40K,, 40(K -1), ...,4OKL, where K, = (A 
+ N + S)/2 > 0 and KL = K, -n = K, - 
S = (A + N - S)/2 < 0. This implies that one 
of the values is zero. The proposition is proved. 
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